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Neste estudo estimamos a demanda para a despesa pública local nas municipalidades brasileiras dentro de 
uma abordagem do eleitor mediano. Os resultados obtidos são consistentes com a teoria que sugere esta 
hipótese como útil para descrever a demanda para bens públicos locais no Brasil. O uso da regressão 
quantílica permite investigar os impactos das variáveis nas despesas públicas locais através de diferentes 
classes de despesas, avaliando a heterogeneidade municipal. Nossos resultados sugerem também que o 
impacto do tamanho da cidade na qualidade de bens mostra efeitos de aglomeração entre zero e um. 
Entretanto,  o  congestionamento  marginal  diminui  ligeiramente  com  a  despesa,  resultado  este 
surpreendente porque sugere que o efeito congestionamento deve ser mais elevado em cidades grandes.  
As  indivisibilidades  que  impossibilitam  a  provisão  de  determinados  serviços  em  cidades  pequenas 
concentram  sua  provisão  em  cidades  maiores.  As  despesas  mais  elevadas  daquelas  cidades  grandes 
refletem não somente um custo de aglomeração, mas também o fato que estas cidades oferecem uma 
escala maior de serviços. Assim, no Brasil, contrário aos resultados tradicionais, o efeito reduzido do 
congestionamento  ao  longo  das  classes  da  despesa  reflete  a  predominância  dos  elementos  da  escala 
medidos pelas elasticidades da população sobre os efeitos do preço. 




In this paper we estimated the demand for local public spending for the Brazilian municipalities within a 
median  voter’s  framework.  Results  obtained  are  consistent  with  the  theoretical  background  thus 
suggesting that this hypothesis might be useful to describe the demand for local public goods in Brazil.  In 
particular, the use of quantile regression permitted to investigate the impacts of the conditioning variables 
on local public expenses across different expenditures classes thus allowing for heterogeneity across 
municipalities. Our results also suggest that the impact of the city size on the quality of club goods shows 
crowding effects as g is between zero and one. However, in the estimated models, marginal congestion 
slightly decreases with expenditure. This is a rather surprising result as one is tempted to conclude that the 
congestion effect should be higher on big cities. Yet, a more careful look shows the drawbacks of such 
interpretation.  The  indivisibilities  that  preclude  the  provision  of  certain  services  in  small  towns, 
concentrate their provision on larger cities. Hence, the higher expenditures of those big cities reflect not 
only a crowding cost but also the fact that these towns offer a wide range of services when compared to 
the small ones. So, in Brazil, contrary to the traditional results, the reduced congestion effect along the 
spending classes reflect the predominance of the scale elements measured by the population elasticities 
over the price effects.  
Key Words: Local Public Services; Median Voter Hypothesis; Quantile Regression Method.  






The evaluation of the public expenditure has become an area of increasing interest since the 
seminal work of Samuelson (1954). Theoretical advances of the theory of public goods took into 
account the particularities of the provision of those services at a local level (Tiebout, 1956). 
Tiebout' s key insight was that this problem is different when local governments provide goods to 
citizens  who  can  move  among  distinct  jurisdictions.  If  citizens  are  faced  with  an  array  of 
communities that offer different types or levels of public goods and services, then each citizen 
will choose the community that best satisfies his or her own particular demands. Individuals 
effectively reveal their preferences by "voting with their feet." Competition among jurisdictions 
results in homogeneous communities, with residents that all value public services similarly. In 
equilibrium, no individual can be made better off by moving, and the market is efficient, thus not 
requiring a political solution to provide the optimal level of public goods.  
A vast literature in local public finance has built on the Tiebout' s hypothesis about community 
choice to estimate demands for local public goods and to verify to what extent property values 
reflect area taxes and services. Among those works we find the seminal studies of Borchesing 
and Deacon (1972) and Bergstrom and Goodman (1973). Their motivation was to test the validity 
of the median voter theorem that provides a method of aggregating individual voter' s demands to 
obtain community demand. Under a set of strong hypotheses such as a single-peaked preferences 
and a single-dimensional public good and by using the voter with median income as a proxy for 
the median voter, these studies estimated demand functions for various local public services. The 
rationale for applying the median voter theorem to the study of local public services came from 
the fact that in federal systems voter’s preferences are more likely to be reflected at the local level 
as the consumers of public services have a better knowledge of the benefits and costs of the local 
public  expenditures.  Median  income  and  an  index  of  median  tax  prices  as  well  as  variables 
supposed to capture demographic and institutional characteristics have been used as explanatory 
variables.  Later  on,  Bergstrom,  Rubinfeld  and  Shapiro  (1982)  applied  a  new  method  for 
estimating demand for local public goods from survey data. Individuals'  responses to questions 
about whether they wanted more, less, or the same amount of various local public goods are 
combined with observations of their incomes, tax rates, and the amounts of actual spending in 
their home communities. Parameter estimates turn out to be quite similar to those found with 
studies like Bergstrom and Goodman' s study based on total expenditures across communities. 
The authors consider that the fact of similar estimates to be derived from two different types of 
data indicates the robustness of both approaches  
The  robustness  of  the  median  voter  framework  is  corroborated  by  several  recent  studies. 
Empirical research, such as those presented by Aronson, Lundberg and Wikström (2000), Doi 
(1998),  Dahlberg  and  Jacob  (1998,  2000),  Turnbull  and  Djoundourian  (1994),  Turnbull  and 
Chang (1998), Gross (1995), tends to support the hypothesis that the median voters’ preferences 
determine  government  fiscal  behaviour.  In  particular,  it  was  suggested  that  the  median  voter 
model  provides  a  better  explanation  of  large-scale  public  programs  than  comparable  interest 
group models (Congleton and Shughart (1990), Congleton and Bennett (1995)). A good survey of 
this literature could be found in Reiter and Weichenrieder (1997), which presented a conceptual 
and  methodological  critical  survey  covering  the  empirical  literature  on  the  demand  for  local 
public goods.   
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As usual, the main problems plaguing those studies are related to the aggregation criteria of the 
preferences. The usual solution, based on the theorem of the median voter, do not guarantee, 
under the current political process, that provision of a local public good will, indeed, represent 
the amount demanded by any individual in the community. Other sources of problems include 
measurement errors in variables, the heteroskedasticity and/or autocorrelation that can result in 
biased estimators. Also, the estimated values for the elasticities are questioned as, de facto, these 
studies do not measure the demand for public goods, but only public expenditures. Last, but not 
least, empirical results for local public services, based on the value of the estimated congestion 
parameters,  compel  some  economists  to  conclude  prematurely  that  those  services  could  be 
privatized. They argue that if the crowding is not induced by rivalry in the consumption of public 
services, but rather by negative agglomeration externalities, crowding elasticities close to unity 
do not imply that these services can be efficiently be supplied by "private competing clubs". If 
the production of public services presents economies of scale, competition between jurisdictions 
may lead to a sub-optimal provision of those services. To tackle those problems, recently, a new 
line of research using nonparametric tests, inspired by Varian’s critique (1982, 1990) based on 
the theory of reveled preferences, tried to validate the median voter hypothesis ((Turnbull and 
Chang (1998), Baudry, LePrince and Moreau (2002)). Their results contribute to reinforce the 
median voter hypothesis as a useful approximation of governance within a democratic context. 
Further, it was found that the single service and single tax base assumptions are not critical to the 
empirical performance of the median voter model. Yet, Turnbull and Djoundourian (1994), by 
using the Cox specification test, using data from general purpose municipal governments, found 
that  the  median  voter  hypothesis  is  appropriate  for  explaining  the  aggregate  behaviour  of 
municipal governments but does not perform so well when applied to specific services.  
As for Brazil, recently, Sampaio de Sousa and Stosic (2003a) and Sampaio de Sousa, Cribari-
Neto and Stosic (2003b) applied nonparametric techniques (DEA - Data Envelopment Analysis 
and  FDH  -  Free  Disposal  Hull)  to  measure  the  level  of technical efficiency of the Brazilian 
municipalities by using a multiple input output framework. These studies represent an attempt to 
compute robust efficiency scores for evaluating Brazilian municipalities using the 2000 census 
data.  This  approach  highlights  the  efficiency  aspects  of  local  public  spending.  Under  this 
approach, the emphasis is placed on the determination of a cost-efficiency frontier associated 
with the production of public goods that would permit to estimate the efficiency levels of the 
various  municipalities.  The  above-mentioned  approach  focuses  on  the  supply  aspects  of  the 
provision of local public goods. To our best knowledge no study has attempted to investigate the 
determinants of the demand for local public goods in Brazil following the tradition initiated by 
the seminal papers by Borchesing and Deacon (1972) and Bergstrom and Goodman (1973).  This 
type of analysis is particularly appropriate to explain the levels and distribution of the various 
local services. Besides, the knowledge of demand functions for public services serves various 
purposes: they allow us to know the outcomes of alternative political decision methods and tax 
structures in a particular locality. They disclose the existence economies of scale at the municipal 
levels and help to assess the effects of changes in the demographic and economic variables on the 
amount  of  services  to  be  demanded.  For  those  reasons,  analysing  the  demand  side  may  add 
relevant information on the provision of such goods thus being a useful complement the previous 
referred studies.   
 
The objective of this paper is to assess the demand for local public services in the Brazilian 
municipalities within a median voter framework. In order to achieve our purpose we will employ 
quantile regression techniques, introduced for Koenker and Basset (1978). We hope this study  
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will contribute to the recent debate, in Brazil on the economics of decentralization by helping to 
establish quantitative parameters for those discussions.  
 
This paper unfolds as follows. Section 2 describes the theoretical model based in the median 
voter framework. Section 3 describes the data and variables. Section 4 presents the econometric 
model.  Section  5  presents  the  econometric  results.  Finally,  Section  6  summarizes  the  main 
conclusions.  
 
2. THE MEDIAN VOTER MODEL 
 
In this model, individuals maximize a quasi-concave utility function subject a budget constraint. 
The price of the private good (x) has been normalized to be equal to 1. All individuals within the 
jurisdiction consume the same level of the public service, herein denoted by z, whose price is pz.  
The others variables are the individual median income (ym), the tax share (ti) and level of locally 
raised taxes or total tax revenue (T). The quantity supplied of a public commodity by a given 
locality is equal to its median quantity demanded by its citizens which median income. Hence, 
the individual’s problem consists in maximizing its utility function, given by: 
[1] u (xi, z)                                                                                                    
 
Subject to the its budget constraint: 
 
[2] ym = x + tibm                                                                                               
where  ym  represents  the  income  of  the  median  voter, bm its tax base and t the tax rate. The 
individual’s demand functions depend also on the government’s budget constraint, given by: 
[3] cZ = G + tB                                 
where  c  is  the  constant  marginal  and  average  cost  of  production  of  public  service
1,  tB 
corresponds to total tax revenues and G represents the intergovernmental grants received by the 
municipality. Rearranging (2) we have: 
[4]  t = [cZ – G]/B 
Due to the presence of congestion (or crowding out) in consumption, the quality of the public 
service depends on the size of the community’s population (N). Using the proportional metric 
proposed by Bocherding and Deacon (1972), the congestion function may be written as: 
[5] Z = N
g z
                                                                                                                      
where g measures the crowding out or congestion effect. If g is one, the public good is private and 
there is no benefit from scale economies for the community: the individual consumption is equal 
to 1/N. On the other hand, if g is zero the good is a purely public good. Notice that if g is higher 
than  one  the  good  is  marginally  overcongested  (Reiter  and  Weichenrieder  (1999)).  Every 
                                                 
1 Bergstrom and Goodman (op.cit., p. 280) showed that this will be possible even if communities produce public 
goods  using  some  local  inputs  whose  prices  may  differ  from place to place, so long as all municipalities have 
identical, homothetic production functions and face horizontal supply curves for inputs.  
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additional user requires an increase in the supply of Z so as to keep z constant. Values of g 
between 0 and 1 allow for the possibility of goods that have partly private and partly public 
characteristics,  where  crowding  effects  are  presents  but  there  are  still  economies  of  scale  in 
consumption. 
Using (3) and (5) in the median voter’s budget constraint gives:  
[6] ya  =  ym   +  g(bm/b)  =  x + (bm/b) cN
g-1z                                                                                                 
where  ya  corresponds  to  the  median  revenue  increased  by  its  share  of  per  capita 
intergovernmental grants, g = G/N, and b = B/N, where B stands for the total tax base. The 
median voter’s income plus its share of the per capita intergovernmental transfer must finance its 
privates expenses as well as its cost share on the public good (bm/b)Ni
g-1 z.  Rewriting [6] we 
have:  
[7] x  = ym   +  (bm/b)[g -  cN
g-1z]   
Replacing [7] in [1] yields the following maximization problem: 
[8]  max u  = u[( ym   +  (bm/b)[g -  cN
g-1z]), z]  
Assuming that the maximization of [8] yields the median voter’s demand function for the local 
public good, z, we have:  
[9]  z  =  z  [ya, (bm/b), N]  
Defining the tax price of the public service as the individual cost of purchase one additional 
monetary unit of the local public services it can be derived by differentiating ya with respect to z. 
The tax price is therefore: 
[10] ￿y/￿z = p = (bm/b) cN
g-1                                                                                
Each consumer knows his own tax price and is able to determinate the amount of commodity
2 
which his choose for the community. Supposing that the demand function defined by [9] z = f(pi, 
ya) is characterized by constant price and income elasticity, this demand can be written as: 
[11] z = a p
b1 y
b2  
Using [10], rearranging the terms and re-written in log form yields the model for the demand to 
be used here: 




Writing [10] in terms of Z, by means of  [5] we have: 
[13]  Z =  z N





                                                 
2 Reiter and Weichenrieder (1997, p. 21) showed three reasons why electors may misperceive the costs of public 
services: “fiscal illusion”; “flypaper effect” and “revenue-complexity”   
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Finally, adding a vector W of socio-economic characteristics, which are expected to influence 
demand, and multiplying [13] by p leads to an estimable function of local, E: 
[14] E = p Z = p z N






Equation [15] represents the standard estimation equation for analyzing the demand for locally 
supplied public goods: 
[15] LnE = k + (1+￿1) [ln (bm/b)] + ￿2(lnya) + ￿3(lnW.) + ￿4(lnNi) + ￿i                             
With k = lna + (1+￿1)ln c                                                                                                    
where  (1+￿1)  is the price elasticity of the demand. The population elasticity, ￿4, satisfy the 
following equation: 
[16] ￿4+ ￿1  = g(1 + ￿1)                                                                                                         
 




The data used in this study were obtained from the Census 2000 of IBGE (Instituto Brasileiro de 
Geografia e Estatística – Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics). The sample consists of 
3.427 municipalities out of a total of 5.264 Brazilian municipalities. The communes for whom 
some information was missing were excluded of the data set. Data on local tax revenues was 
obtained from STN (Secretaria do Tesouro Nacional – National Treasure Secretariat). Table 1 





The dependent variable of the model, E represents the value of municipal current spending. The 
explanatory variables are described as follows: firstly, in Models 1 and 2, the tax share variable 
(bm/b) accruing to the citizen with the median income is computed as the local tax revenue 
divided by the total tax revenue (total revenue across municipalities). In Models 3 and 4 we 
define the tax price as the ratio between the median and average income. The median income is 










Table 1: Dependent and Explanatory Variables: A Brief Description  
 
Dependent Variable   Description 
Local Public Spending - E  The value of municipal current spending. 
Explanatory Variables   Description 
Distance   “Spatial” variable, to show the relevance of neighborhood effect. 
Tax share – bm/b   The tax share of the citizen with the median income, calculated by two 
criteria:  first,  total  revenue  local/total  revenue  general;  and  second, 
based on the ratio between the median and the average income. 
Median Income - ym  Median earnings, calculated by two criteria: median income plus tax 
share (two criteria) x  per capita intergovernmental grants.   
Total Population - N  Number of citizens in a municipality (total population). 
% Population > 60 years old  Citizens older than 60 in percent of total population.  
Matrix W (socioeconomic 
characteristics) 
Description 
Demographic Density   Population/area of the community (scale variable). 
Hospital and Health Services  Health variable, as a proxy for health services. 
Enrollment   Education  scale  variable.  Data  refers  to  primary  and  secondary 
enrollment in municipal schools. 
% of Households whose Head Earns 
up to 1 Minimum Wage  
Poverty proxy. 
Dummy variables  Description 
Capital   If  the community is (1) or is not (0) state capital. 
Participation in Inter-Municipal 
Consortia  
Proxy  to  administrative  coordination  and  organization  among 
municipalities. 
Draught Area (Poligono da Seca)   Municipalities located in this area, hit by adverse climatic condition 
take 1; zero otherwise. 
North, Northeast, Southeast and South 
Regions 
Proxies  to  evaluate  for  regional  and  geographic  influence. 
Municipalities located in these regions take 1; zero otherwise 
Political Parties (PT and PDT)  Political party of the mayor. 
 
 
4. THE ECONOMETRIC MODEL 
 
Let n be the number of municipalities,  )' ,..., ( 1 n y y y =  the vector of municipal expenses, X a 
matrix of dimension n x p, containing the municipality characteristics,  b  a p-dimensional vector 
of unknown parameters and and u an n-dimensional vector of random errors. We can write a 
regression model as  
 
. ,..., 1 , ) ; ( n t u x f y t t t = + = b  
 
Here,  t x  denotes the p-dimensional vector of the characteristics of the t-th municipality. As we 
do not have a priori information about the functional form of f, its is common practice to assume 
linearity:    
. u X y + = b  
 
Another  important  aspect  of  modeling  in  classical  regression,  in  our  particular  case,  is  the 
possibility of existence of spatial effects due to the existence of some functional relationship 
between the municipal efficiency structures in two distinct points in space. The smaller the area  
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where those points are located, the higher the probability of geographical correlation. Anselin 
(1988) proposed the following model to explicitly consider the spatial dependency: 
 
u X Wy + + = b r q  ,    with   , e Wu u + = l  
 
where W is a n x n matrix that controls for the existence of a neighborhood effects. Here, the 
parameter  r   measures  the  spatial  correlation  that,  if  different  from  zero,  implies  that  the 
computed  efficiency  score  of  a  given  municipality  is  directly  affected  by  the  scores  of  its 




Here we will use two forms for the W matrix: first, the element (i,j) from W will be one if 
municipalities  i  and  j  are  neighbors  and  zero  otherwise,  neighborhood  being  defined  as 
geographical distance that does not exceed 50 kilometers; secondly, the element (i,j) from W will 
be  equal  to  the  distance  between  municipalities  i  and  j  divided  by  the  maximum  distance 
encountered; hence, we have a measure between zero and one for all pairs of localities and not 
only a binary measure of neighborhood.  
 
As the municipalities differ significantly on various aspects, it is reasonable to expect that their 
associated  regression  errors  also  display  different  variances.  Thus,  when  estimating  the 
parameters we should take into account the existence of heteroskedasticity. 
 
5.  ECONOMETRIC RESULTS  
 
Results obtained by using the classical OLS model are presented in Table 2 and should serve as a 
counterpoint  for  the  ones  obtained  by  using  quintile  regression  estimators.  Notice  that  the 
estimates shown in Table 2 are corrected by the statistics of White, for heteroskedasticity as we 
are dealing with cross section data.   
 
Firstly, we observe that all the parameters are significant and show the expected sign. Notice that 
results  shown  in  Table  2  suggest  the  relevance  of  the  neighborhood  effect  in  the  spatial 
distribution of the spending patterns. Indeed, in all four models considered, we found a positive 
spatial  correlation,  thus  indicating  that  higher  spending  levels  tend  to  spread  out,  at  least, 
partially, to the surrounding localities, in some sort of  spill over or “demonstration effect”. 
 
The low values for the estimated coefficients for the price variable are on the ranges of the ones 
found on the empirical literature (see Reiter and Weicherieder (1997)) and point out to a very 
inelastic demand as far as this variable is concerned. This is particularly true when the tax price 
of the i-th municipality is based on fiscal effort, defined as its participation on the total municipal 
tax revenue, used in Model 1 to 2. Notice that on models 3 and 4, we defined the tax share as the 
ratio between the median and the average income. In spite of the main difficulties in estimating 
the tax price, including the ones caused by measurements errors, this result is quite robust and 
seems to hold even under extreme assumptions (Bergstrom and Goodman (1973)). 
 
As for the income variable, we found that the income elasticity of municipal expenditures is 
positive  and  inferior  to  the  unity  as  attested  by  previous  studies  (see  for  example,  Reiter  e 
                                                 
3 Notice that there is no direct interest in the estimation of l and r.  
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Weicherieder (1997)). The estimated coefficients range from 0,47 to 0,58 showing that municipal 
public  spending  in  Brazil  is  not  a  luxury  although  our  estimates  are  clearly  above  the 
international average, according to which those goods conform more to the pattern of “basic” 
needs. Finally, as expected, a higher population increases the demand for public goods.  
 
Regarding the crowding out effect, let us compute the value for the parameter g, which accounts 
for this effect. Its computed value, ranges from 0,66337 to 0,64524, respectively, for Model 2 and 
4. This is clearly below the values found by the recent studies (Baudry, Leprince and Moreau 
(2002), Guengant, Josselin and Rocaboy (1995, 2002)) including the one reviewed by Reiter and 
Weicherieder (1997), where this parameter tends to be higher than one, thus implying a strong 
congestion effect. Those studies, following the Borchesing and Deacon (1972) and Bergstrom 
and  Goodman  (1973)  results,  give  little  evidence  that  local  governments  provide  services 
characterized by economies of scale in consumption. Yet, the diverging result obtained for the 
Brazilian communes is hardly surprising. This comparatively large public ness of government-
supplied goods may be explained by the small size of the typical Brazilian municipalities. We 
should  expect  a  lower  congestion  effect  in presence of significant economies of scale in the 
consumption  that  makes  most  of  the  municipality’s  facilities  oversized,  as  is  the  case,  for 
example, with the undersized Brazilian communal hospital and schools. Indeed, an increase in the 
number of inhabitants would lower the tax price of the publicly provided good as its cost is 
shared by a larger group (Sampaio de Sousa, Cribari-Neto and Stosic (2003)). Of course the value 
of this parameter strongly depends on the definition of the tax rate. Yet, even when we use a 
different definition, our estimates were kept significantly below the unity. 
 
Let us now turn to the analysis of impact of the socioeconomic characteristics of the communes 
on their spending pattern. It is interesting to see that, for a municipality, the fact of being a capital 
exerts a powerful influence upon public spending. This important result confirms the role played 
by those cities, which are at the center of political power, in centralizing the demand pressures for 
public  services  in  their  respective  states  and/or  influence  area.  Observe  also  that  being  a 
municipality  situated  on  the  Polígono  das  Secas  leads  to  a  lower  demand  for  public  goods. 
However,  those  results  should  be  carefully  examined  as  this  program  (Polígono  das  Secas) 
includes some of the poorest communes of the Northeast region. As for the regional impact, our 
results show that municipalities belonging to the Northeast and Southeast Regions tend to present 
higher expenses levels. This is consistent with the ideas that, for different reasons, both regions 
have, indeed, a greater demand for public services. In the poor Northeast region, public services 
are, frequently, the only ones available to an impoverished population as its private substitutes 
are lacking. In the relatively rich Southeast region, this increased demand for public goods may 
be due to its more urban characteristics. As for the Northern Region, the lowest demand may be 
due to poor data and its huge dimension and scattered municipalities; this may lead to distortions 
on the regional results.  
 
The  scale  variables  included  in  the  analysis  were  relevant  for  explaining  expenditures  in  all 
models we estimated. As expected, this variable exerts a negative effect on public expenses, thus 
corroborating previous insights suggested by the nonparametric analysis described in previous 
studies (Sampaio de Sousa, Cribari-Neto and Stosic (2003)). In particular, the relatively higher 
expenses of cities with very low demographic density rates is most likely due to the presence of 
local increasing returns to scale prevalent among small municipalities. The scattered population 
on those cities raises the average costs of public services, thus preventing them from exploiting 
the economies of scale that characterizes the production of those services, and so they fail to  
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optimally use their resources.
4 On the other hand, higher density rates decrease the costs of the 
above-mentioned  services,  and  hence  contribute  to  reduce  expenses.  By  the  same  token,  the 
inverse relationship between public expenses and participation in inter-municipal consortia may 
be due to the fact that, ceteris paribus, the coordination among neighbor municipalities to provide 
services,  characterized  by  high  fixed  costs,  as  hospital,  contributes  to  optimize  the  scale  of 
operations and cut costs. This is highly desirable as those consortia permits to reduce expenses 
while expanding the services. Finally, concerning the variables Hospital and Health Services and 
Enrollment, they have, as expected, a significant and positive effect on municipal expenditures. 
  
Table 2: Determinants of the Demand for Local Public Goods in Brazilian Municipalities  
– 2000 - OLS Results  
 
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿  ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 
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4 In the case of educational services, there is wide evidence that operating costs decrease with enrolment due to 
existence of high fixed costs. Consequently, larger schools tend to be more cost-efficient because the fixed costs are 
diluted among a higher number of students. This fact clearly discriminates against small municipalities since their 
schools have only a few students on average, and thus tend to present excessively high average costs. Were those 
cities larger, they would be able to enrol a greater number of students and reduce the cost per student without 







Notice that, contrary to the international evidence, in the Brazilian municipalities, the higher the 
proportion of people aged sixty or more, the lower the public expenditures. This is probably due 
to the fact that, in Brazil, older people are relatively well off when compared with the young and 
thus may afford to use private substitutes for local public goods. Remark that the fact that the old 
people are relatively well off in Brazil is endorsed by recent studies on poverty in Brazil (Neri 
(2000), Hoffman (2000)). On the other hand, the percentage of young people that is supposed to 
increase local expenditures was not significant. 
 
Finally,  regarding  the  impact  of  the  mayor  political  party  on  the  spending  patterns,  only  the 
coefficients for the political parties PT and PDT were significant and positive at 5% level, thus 
indicating that municipalities run by a mayor coming from these parties tend to spend more. This 
is consistent with the known characteristics of those political parties regarding the role of the 
government on local expenses.  
 
5.1 Quantile Regression Estimates 
 
To  complement  the  econometric  analysis  carried  out  in  the  previous  sub-section,  we  shall 
proceed to a more detailed investigation using quantile regression methods, as introduced by 
Koenker and Bassett (1978). Just as classical linear regression allows one to estimate models for 
conditional  mean  functions,  quantile  regression  methods  offer  a  mechanism  for  estimating 
models for the conditional median function, and also for other conditional quantile functions. The 
OLS estimate considers only the effect of one variable in the medium point of the conditional 
distribution of another dependent variable (expenditure, in this case). The use of the quantile 
regression method allows the analysis of the impact of explanatory variables on different points 
of the conditional distribution of the dependent variable. This allows us to investigate the impacts 
of  the  conditioning  variables  on  local  public  expenses  across  different  expenditures  classes. 
Hence, one can examine the differences due to the structural heterogeneity of expenditures in 
various localities and the different effects of each variable depending on the expenditure class 
taken into consideration. The basic idea is to estimate the t -th quantile of efficiency conditional 
on the different explanatory variables, assuming that this quantile may be expressed as a linear 
predictor based on these variables
5.  
Consider (yi, xi), i= 1,2,...,n a sample of a given population, in which xi is a vector of the Kx1 
explanatory variables. The ￿ -th quantile of y, the dependent variable, with 0 < ￿ < 1, is defined 
as: Qy(￿)
  = F
-1 (￿ ) =  inf {y : F(y) ￿ ￿}, where F is the function of continuous distribution (non-
conditioned) of y: F(y) = Prob (Y￿ y). In the linear case, the dependent variable y is an x function 
on the form: yi = xi￿ + ￿i , in which ￿ is the parameters vector and ￿i is the random errors vector. 
That configures the case of conditional quantiles of the distribution of y, defined by the quantiles 
errors  distribution:  Pr(yi  ￿  y/xi)  = F￿￿ (y - x'i￿￿ /xi), i=1,2,...,n. The quantile function can be 
defined then, in the form: Q￿ (yi /xi) = x'i￿￿ + F￿
 -1(￿). The ￿￿ estimated from the former quantile 
function,  defined  as  an  estimator  of  the  quantile  regression,  is  found  as  the  solution  of  the 
following objective function: 
                                                 
5 For further details on the method see Koenker & Basset ( 1978, 1982),  Buchinsky (1998),  Koenker e Machado 
(1999) and  Koenker & Hallock, (2001).  
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                                                                                                           n 
min 1/n ￿ ￿|yi - xi' ￿| + ￿ (1 - ￿) |yi - xi' ￿| = min 1/￿ ￿ ￿￿ (yi - xi' ￿), 









￿                                                       i=1 
in which r (.) is the "check" function defined by: ￿￿ (z) = {￿z, se z ￿ 0; and  (￿ - 1), se z < 0￿ ￿ ￿ ￿. 
 
In this case, the minimization of absolute values to the conventional median function is observed, 
apart from the minimizing of squared residuals. The model specifies the conditional quantile 
function of the dependent variable y, given the explanatory variable matrix X as: Qy (￿|X) = 
X￿(￿),  ￿  =  [0,1].  The  representation  in  form  of  the  linear  programming  model  makes  the 
parameter estimating easier. The objective function, previously presented, is a weighted sum of 
absolute deviations, providing a robust localization measure, so that the estimated coefficient 
vector is not sensitive to extreme observations on the dependent variable.  When the errors do not 
follow a regular distribution, the quantile regression estimators can be more efficient than the 
OLS estimators. Different solutions to distinct quantiles can be interpreted as differences on the 
dependent variable response to changes on the regressors in several points of the conditional 
distribution of the dependent variable. 
The study of the asymptotic behavior of the quantile regression estimate, which allows inferring 
on  the  estimated  coefficients,  requires  the  following  additional  hypotheses:  (Koenker  & 
Basset,1982):  a)  (density):  the  error  distribution,  F￿,  has  a  continuous  and  strictly  positive 
density, f￿, to every z, so that: 0 < F￿ (z) < 1; b) (picture): the sequence {xi} satisfies n
 - 1 ￿ xixi'  ￿ 
D, a defined positive matrix; and c) (scale): the sequence of scale functions takes the form ￿n (x) 
= 1 + x￿n , in which ￿n = ￿0/(n)
1/2 , to some fixed ￿0 ￿ R
k. 
To i.i.d. errors there is: (n)




Therefore, the asymptotic precision of the quantile regression estimate to i.i.d. errors depends 
basically on the quantity: S(￿) = [f(F
-1(￿))]
-1 , usually called “sparsity” function (Tukey, 1975). To 
non-independent and identically distributed errors, the covariance matrix limit takes the form: 
(n)
1/2 (￿(￿) - ￿(￿)) ￿ N ( 0, Hn
-1 Jn Hn
-1), in which  Jn(￿)= ￿ (1 - ￿) n
-1 ￿ xi xi'  ; and Hn(￿) = lim n
-1 ￿ 
xi xi'  fi(￿i(￿))
  and in which fi(￿i(￿)) is the conditional density of the variable response yi estimated 
in t-th quintile. In the i.i.d. case, the fi(￿i(￿)) functions are identical and the “Huber Sandwich” 
equals the i.i.d. errors expression. 
To make inference based on general hypotheses, we used the Wald’s approach. As considered in 
Koenker & Basset (1982), a general linear hypothesis can be adopted on the vector ￿ = (￿(￿1)' , ...., 
￿(￿m)' )'  from the form: H0: H￿ = h. 
The statistic test is:  Tn = (H￿ - h)’ [H (￿ Ä(X’X)
 – 1)
 H’]
 – 1 (H￿ - h), which is asymptotically ￿
2 
under H0. This formulation embraces a great variety of situations, of simple tests over a single 
coefficient to collective tests involving various coefficients and different quantiles. Therefore, it 
is  possible,  for  instance,  to  test  for  the  equality  of  the  several  slopes  of  coefficients  among 
various quantiles. 
We thus re-estimate the OLS models by using the techniques of quantile regression. In order to 
do that, we considered the following conditional quantiles: 0.10 (percentile 10%), 0.25 (lower 
quartile), 0.50 (median), 0.75 (upper quartile) e 0.90 (percentile 90%), that is (￿ = 0.10; 0.25;  
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0.50;  0.75;  0.90).    We  used  the  estimation  method  “BR”,  proposed  by  Barrodale-Roberts), 
adequate for the case where the sample size has around 3500 observations and the only one that 
allows for the "rank test". The errors were considered not i.i.d, thus allowing for the presence of 
heteroskedasticity.  Notice  also  that  this  method  satisfy  the  criterion  of  "goodness-of-fit"  (the 
"pseudo-R
2)  for  model  selection  (see  Koenker  &  Machado,  1999).  We  kept  the  explanatory 
variables that proved to be statistically significant in the OLS model.  
Results are shown in Table 3 and Table 4. Although confirming the ones found by using the OLS 
model, we obtain differentiated results according to the class of expenditure considered. The 
computed Wald statistics shows that the differences in the slopes are significant. 
 
Table 3: Determinants of the Demand For Local Public Goods in Brazilian Municipalities – 2000  
-  Quantile Regression Results – Model 2 
-   
Dependent Variables: Aggregate Municipalities’ Expenditures by Quintiles 
Variables  0,10  0,25  0,50  0,75  0,90 










































































































































































Notes:  a)  the  results  in  brackets  stand  for  the  estimated  parameters  standard  errors;    b)  *  significant  parameter  in  1%;  ** 





Table 4: Determinants of the Demand For Local Public Goods in Brazilian Municipalities – 2000  
-  Quantile Regression Results – Model 4 
 
Dependent Variables: Aggregate Municipalities’ Expenditures by Quintiles 
Variables  0,10  0,25  0,50  0,75  0,90 










































































































































































Notes:  a)  the  results  in  brackets  stand  for  the  estimated  parameters  standard  errors;    b)  *  significant  parameter  in  1%;  ** 
significant parameter in 5%; *** significant parameter in 10%, 
 
Firstly, as expected, the relevance of neighborhood effect increases along the expenditure classes 
suggesting that the spillover effect tends to be higher on larger cities. The metropolitan region is a 
well-known example of this impact. Notice also the impact of the tax price increases along the 
expenditure  classes.  This  is  probably  due  to  the  fact  that  municipalities  presenting  higher 
expenses tend to have a more diversified tax base; their higher tax price elasticities reflect this 
larger diversification as well as the fact that they are more integrated into the market economy. 
Confirming the OLS results, we find that income and population are strong determinants of the 
demand  for  local  public  services.  As  expected,  for  income,  the  impact  increases  with  the 
expenditure class thus showing that higher levels of development bring about increased pressures 
for  those  services.  As  for  the  population,  the  decreasing  effect  across  expenditures  classes  
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suggests the existence of economies of agglomeration. Consistent with this result, the impact of 
the  demographic  density  variable  firstly  increases  and  after  median  expenditure  classes 
diminishes across the higher expenditure classes. This is not surprisingly as the economies of 
scale  in  Brazil  affect  mostly  the  small  cities,  unable  to  wipe  off  the  high  fixed  costs  that 
characterizes the production patterns of local public services. Once cities reach a certain level of 
size, the agglomeration benefits begin to peter out, while diseconomies rise rapidly. By the same 
token, the participation in inter-municipal consortia contributes to reduce public expenditures. 
The inverse relationship between expenditure and participation in inter-municipal consortia was 
caused by economies of scale prevalent among small municipalities. Yet, here, the results show 
that this effect is quite widespread, thus suggesting that even medium sized and relatively big 
cities cannot reach the optimum size for hospitals, for instance, and thus seek to join consortia in 
an attempt to reduce costs. From the efficiency aspect, this is a quite important result as it builds 
up a much-required coordination among municipal administrations.  
 
Results for the congestion effects, for the various percentiles are shown in Table 5. They suggest 
that the crowding parameters are, as in the aggregated case, below the unity. The impact of the 
city size on the quality of club goods shows crowding effects as g is between zero and one. 
However,  in  both models, marginal congestion slightly decreases with expenditure. This is a 
rather surprising result as one is tempted to conclude that the congestion effect should be higher 
on  big  cities.  Yet,  a  more  careful  look  shows  the  drawbacks  of  such  interpretation.  The 
indivisibilities that preclude the provision of certain services in small towns, concentrate their 
provision on larger cities. Hence, the higher expenditures of those big cities reflect not only a 
crowding cost but also the fact that these towns offer a wide range of services when compared to 
the small ones. Confirming these results, the health indicator shows a higher coefficient for the 
last quintile as only those big cities have big hospitals and health centers that perform complex 
and expensive medical procedures. So, in Brazil, contrary to the traditional results, the reduced 
congestion  effect  along  the  spending  classes  reflect  the  predominance  of  the  scale  elements 
measured by the population elasticities over the price effects.  
 
Table 5: Congestion Parameter Along Expenditures Classes 
Classes of Expenditure  Congestion Parameter  
0,10  0,25  0,50  0,75  0,90 
Model 2 
0,69971  0,69944  0,68271  0,65147  0,63536 
Model 4 
0,68909  0,68545  0,67055  0,64622  0,62041 
Source: our calculations 
 
 
As for the population and enrollment variables, the corresponding elasticities are smaller the 
higher the expenditure class, a clear sign that are grounds to exploit the scale economies in the 
Brazilian communes. The impact of the structure of the population on expenditures is strongly  
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affected by the tax price calculation. When the tax share is based on the municipal share of total 
revenues the results confirm those obtained on the aggregate analysis. Yet, as we define the tax 
price as the ratio between the median and average income, the results change; except for the first 
quintile, the coefficients have the expected sign but are not significant.   
Concerning the localization effects, the fact of being a capital has a significant impact on the 
dependent variable, particularly, for those, which are in the middle range of expenditure. This is 
probably due to the fact that medium sized capital cities have not yet reach the point where the 
economies  of  agglomeration  are  exhausted.  Notice  also  that  municipalities  located  in  the 
Northeast and Southeast regions tend to have higher demand for local public goods. The only 
exceptions are the northeast cities located in the lower quintile; being one of those towns has a 
negative but non-significant impact on spending. This is probably due to the fact most of those 
cities are situated in the draught area. As for the North region, the negative impact found on the 
aggregate  levels  decreased  with  the  expenditure  classes  showing that the factor behind those 
results are less prevalent among larger cities.  
 Finally, the political variables – the mayor belonging to the PT or PDT parties - showed positive 
effects on the expenditure. This is a reasonable result considering these are parties that strongly 
defend  governmental  participation  in  the  country’s  economy,  The  results,  however,  are  not 
significant to the extremities of the expenditure classes.  
6.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this paper we estimated the demand for local public spending for the Brazilian municipalities 
within  a  median  voter’s  framework.  Results  obtained  are  consistent  with  the  theoretical 
background thus suggesting that this hypothesis might be useful to describe the demand for local 
public goods in Brazil.  In particular, the use of quantile regression permitted to investigate the 
impacts  of  the  conditioning  variables  on  local  public  expenses  across  different  expenditures 
classes thus allowing for heterogeneity across municipalities. 
 
Confirming previous results we found out that the main variables in this model – price, income 
and population – were significantly and had the expected sign. Specifically, we found that the 
income elasticities indicates that municipal public spending in Brazil is not a luxury although our 
estimates are clearly above the international average, according to which those goods conform 
more  to  the  pattern  of  “basic”  needs.  Finally,  as  expected,  a  higher population increases the 
demand for public goods.  
 
Our  results  also  suggest that the impact of the city size on the quality of club goods shows 
crowding  effects  as  g  is  between  zero  and  one.  However,  in  the  estimated models, marginal 
congestion slightly decreases with expenditure. This is a rather surprising result as one is tempted 
to conclude that the congestion effect should be higher on big cities. Yet, a more careful look 
shows the drawbacks of such interpretation. The indivisibilities that preclude the provision of 
certain services in small towns, concentrate their provision on larger cities. Hence, the higher 
expenditures of those big cities reflect not only a crowding cost but also the fact that these towns 
offer a wide range of services when compared to the small ones. So, in Brazil, contrary to the 
traditional  results,  the  reduced  congestion  effect  along  the  spending  classes  reflect  the 
predominance of the scale elements measured by the population elasticities over the price effects.  
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The natural extension of our current investigation would be to include a more detailed description 
of  the  spillover  effects  that  characterizes  the  demand  for  public  goods,  particularly  on  the 
metropolitan areas. This will give a more complete perception of demand for local public services 
in the Brazilian municipalities. 
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